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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the role of the public manager and the contracting process when 
outsourcing government goods and services to private vendors for public service delivery. Using 
the Transaction Cost Framework, this paper will examine the relationship between training and 
contract processes as well as the influence of democratic values on private vendor performance.   
This paper is divided into five sections. The first section provides a review of the 
literature related to public administration and the contracting process. The following sections 
present case studies using the Transaction Cost Framework. The second section presents the first 
case study, exploring the privatization of government services in Sandy Springs, Georgia and 
Weston, Florida. The third section presents the second case study and examines contracting 
ethics and vendor performance at Pelican Bay State Prison. The fourth section includes a 
discussion about contracting processes and performance outcomes from both case studies and 
recommendations for public managers working in government contracting roles.    
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
During his 1999 lecture on the “Repositioning of American Pubic Administration,” H. 
George Frederickson suggested that public administration reemerged as the “key element in the 
effectiveness of American government in the twentieth century” (p.702). Appealing to his 
audience at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (ASPA), 
Fredrickson argued that every significant accomplishment of American government over the last 
century was a result of public management.  
Traditional forms of public administration, or ‘scientific management,’ suggested that the 
functions of government should be driven by scientific methodology to better measure outputs 
and outcomes, limit financial waste, and ensure government accountability to the public 
(Frederickson, 1999). 
In the years following Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, debates supporting private-
business approaches to public management began to emerge (Romzek & Johnston, 2004; 
Schooner, 2004; Rendon, 2005).  By the end of the 1980s, public administration repositioned 
itself away from clashes within political science towards cross-sector collaboration. Trends 
supporting partnerships between government, private vendors, and non-profit groups emerged to 
better address growing demands from the public sphere (Frederickson, 1999). During the 1990’s, 
presidential initiatives to make government “work better and cost less” … helped champion a 
“variety of reforms and projects” in-line with cross-sector collaboration and New Public 
Management (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000, p. 550).” 
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Contracting and New Public Management 
Evolving economic climates influenced public and political interests in investments, 
production, and consumption. The changing environment created a need for collaboration across 
public and private sectors. Traditional government largely shifted away from the hands of the 
public, towards networks of private and public agents to manage increasingly globalized 
transactions (Frederickson, 1999). In an attempt to define New Public Management, Frederickson 
examined the relationship between those who govern and those who are governed.  “Public 
management is now understood to include government but also all of those organizations and 
institutions that contract with government to do governmental work…and the wide range of 
organizations and institutions that are essentially quasi-governmental in their relationship with 
citizens (Frederickson, 1999, p.703).   
Scholars suggest that the government and governance are not synonymous. In the context 
of contracting, where government consists of local, state, federal institutions bound by 
democratic values, governance is the mechanism in which government is executed by non-state 
actors.  
Private vendors have financial incentives to achieve contract outcomes. If a vendor does 
not perform contract outputs to achieve contract success, they may not get paid. Unless 
democratic values are written with contract provisions and are also monitored by public 
managers, private vendors determine what contract success means and how to achieve it in ways 
that are efficient for business, not necessarily the public interest. The ways in which contracts are 
drafted by public managers and are subsequently perceived by private actors, determine how 
private vendors achieve contract goals (Amirkhanyan & Lambright, 2007). This feature of 
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contracting is widely considered a function critical to the modern administrative process (Van 
Slyke, 2002; Snider & Rendon, 2010). 
Contracting for public service delivery provides promise for improving government 
performance. This practice is not new. The growth, size, and scope of contracting at all levels of 
government continues to expand. (Bertelli & Smith, 2010; Light 2000). Light (2000) argues that 
the size of government is not merely the number of civil service employees who hold 
government jobs. The true size of government should also include number of non-government 
actors such as private vendors, non-profit entities, and grantees hired to carry out public service 
delivery. Light (2000) measured the true size government in 1999 and 2002 using data from the 
Office of Personnel Management’s “Fact Book” of Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics, the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; input/model of the U.S. economy, and the Federal 
Procurement Data System. 
Contrary to claims that the size of government consisted of less than 1.9 million 
employees in both 1999 and 2002, Light (2000) argued that this measure only accounted for civil 
service employees. According to Light, civil service workers only account for a fraction of the 
total number of government employees. These numbers failed to account for the section of the 
workforce which included private vendors performing government services. Rather than 
government shrinking to 1.9 million workers, Light (2000) found that the actual size of 
government (accounting for both civil servants and private vendors) comprised of over 16 
million employees. While the number of public servants remained at 8.7 million in 1999 and 
2002, the number of private vendors increased from 6.9 million in 1999 to 8 million in 2002.  
In 1997, federal agencies spent $175 billion on private contracting. Seven years later, in 
2004, spending rose to $328 billion; an increase of 87 percent. In 2011, federal procurement 
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accounted for over $534 billion, nearly 13% of the total federal budget (Federal Procurement 
Data System, 2011).  
Hollow State 
Milward and Provan (2000) examined factors that drive private contracting, network 
structures, and government accountability. Their research introduced the notion of the ‘hollow-
state,’ referring to the capacity in which public agencies retain power and control over the goods 
and services they outsource. Their findings suggest that the more public agencies outsource 
service delivery to private vendors, the more likely they are to lose their ability to retain control 
over production and oversight of service delivery.  
Third-Party Bureaucracy 
Salamon (1998) used the term “third-party government” to suggest that government is no 
longer provided by public service workers but by a variety of private vendors contracted to 
deliver public goods and services. Heinrich, Lynn, and Milward (2009) suggest that “even if they 
are not engaging directly in-service provisions, governments play a far more vital role than just 
funding (private) services” (p. i17). Heinrich et al. argue “there is a basic agreement that third-
party entities … play influential roles, and how the government (drafts) contracts … has critical 
implications for what is accomplished and how” (p. i5).  
Contracting 
Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright (2007) discuss why government agencies choose to 
contract out for service delivery by asking two fundamental questions. 1. “What factors may 
impact a government agency’s decision to contract out a particular service?” and 2. “What 
factors influence contractor performance?” Understanding why services are outsourced and how 
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services are outsourced provides vital information for public administrators in contracting 
environments.   
The complexities inherent in contracting create unique challenges. First, managers should 
understand the nuances unique to contracting relationships as no two contracts are the same. It is 
also important for managers to understand the motivation of the private vendor. Vendors may or 
may not operate according a democratic value set that serves the public. If the manager does not 
identify gaps inherent in the role of the vendor and the value sets of the public organization, 
contract ambiguity can threaten the outcome of service delivery. Managers should be systematic 
in identifying, initiating, designing, implementing, and measuring the lifecycle of the contract 
(Kettl, 1993). If the manager fails to clearly communicate contract provisions and intended 
outputs, the vendor can achieve contract outcomes contrary to the public interest.  
Milward and Provan provide fair warning to public managers who outsource government 
services (2000). If contract provisions don’t clearly define the outputs to achieve the intended 
outcome, private vendors are provided the opportunity to determine the means in which they 
meet the outcome of the contract. Without clear contract expectations, incentives, and 
consequences for contract violations, private contracting can illicit fraud, waste, and unethical 
behavior. What is good for private vendors can be devastating to the public if public managers 
don’t include necessary contract provisions and oversight.  
Transaction Cost Framework  
According to Brown and Potoski (2005), public managers responsible for “government 
contracting can benefit from a theoretically informed framework that provides … guidance about 
whether to contract (out) for particular services and what capacities are needed to effectively 
manage contracts” (p. 327). Brown and Potoski (2005) introduce the transaction cost framework 
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as a tool to guide managers through the contract management process. The transaction cost 
framework suggests that the costs of “negotiating, implementing, monitoring, and enforcing 
contracts are higher when services have outcomes that are difficult to measure and … require 
asset specific investments” (Brown & Potoski, 2005, p. 327).   
The promise of quality and efficient service delivery largely depends on a managers’ 
capacity to decide when to contract out and for what services, select a viable vendor, and their 
ability to monitor performance throughout the life cycle of the contract (Ferris & Grady, 1986; 
Brown & Potoski, 2005).  
Brown and Potoski (2005) argue that successful contracting is illustrated by three sets of 
tasks. The public manager must decide whether a service should be contracted out, determine a 
vendor or contractor for delivery of the service, and identify a process for maintaining oversight 
of the vendor throughout the lifecycle of the contract.  
Transaction Costs 
Managers should also consider potential transaction costs associated with the contracting 
process. Williamson (1981) defines transaction costs as the “comparative costs of planning, 
adapting, and monitoring task completion under alternative government structures” (p. 552-553). 
Brown and Potoski (2005) suggest that transaction costs “arise because of limited information, 
uncertainty about the future, and the prospect that people or organizations behave 
opportunistically in their interactions with others” (p. 328).  
Transaction costs can also be a result of limited information and varying levels of 
expertise between the manager and the private contractor, which can create role ambiguity, 
uncertainty about the execution and delivery of the contract, and opportunities for parties on both 
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side of the contract to protect their own interests due to the unforeseeable future of contract 
performance.  
To minimize the impact of transaction costs, managers should establish clear performance 
measures, monitor vendor performance and the execution of benchmarks throughout the contract, 
and assign penalties where contract provisions are not executed as written.  
Transaction Cost Theory provides a framework that can help managers assess the nature 
of services be considered for contracting out and the varying degrees of transactions costs 
associated with outsourcing those services (Brown & Potoski, 2005; Williamson, 1981). Brown 
and Potoski focus on two key components of Transaction Cost Theory: asset specificity and ease 
of measurement (2005).  
Asset specificity can increase or decrease market competition. Specific assets, or large 
specialized investments, may have fewer vendors as they are not easily adopted, mass produced, 
or transferable for other uses or services. They are specific and unique to the service(s) in which 
they are utilized (Brown & Potoski, 2005).  
Ease of measurement defines the capacity of the public manager to adequately measure 
vendor performance to assess whether they are meeting contractual provisions. “Easily measured 
services have identifiable service metrics that accurately represent service quantity and quality” 
(Brown & Potoski, 2005, p. 330). 
Services that are easy to measure and require less specific or unique assets are more likely 
to result in contracts with fewer transaction costs (Brown & Potoski, 2005). Because these types 
of services are easy to measure and do not require non-transferable assets or assets specific to the 
service, a greater number of vendors can compete to win the contract – providing leverage to 
public manager to negotiate for quality and cost. Contracts with fewer transaction costs allow 
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public managers to better specify vendor performance standards. Brown and Potoski (2005) 
argue that service contracts with low transaction costs have high promises for cost savings and 
limited risk of contract failure. These types of contracts require simple processes, specify 
common use assets, and contain provisions that allow the manager to measure and monitor 
outputs and outcomes for service delivery throughout the lifecycle of the contract. 
Alternatively, contracting out for services that are difficult to measure and require 
specific investments or assets for service delivery, are associated with high transaction costs. 
These services are defined by the need for specialized, expensive, or non-transferable assets and 
are difficult for managers to create measures that effectively monitor progress. Services with high 
transaction costs are often specialized, complex, and the very nature of their implementation or 
delivery is often outside the scope of the managers expertise – posing a challenge for managers to 
write contracts that are clear and well received by stakeholders (Brown & Potoski, 2005; Ferris & 
Graddy, 1986). Brown and Potoski (2005) recommend that public managers keep these services 
internal or carefully analyze the cost benefit of outsourcing due to the high probability of contract 
failure. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CASE STUDY #1 
In 2002, Brown and Potoski (2005) used survey results from the International 
City/County Manager Association’s (ICMA) survey “profile of Local Government Service 
Delivery Choices” and asked 75 randomly selected city mayors and managers nationwide to rank 
local services relating to asset specificity and ease of measurement. Brown and Potoski argue that 
“the ICMA survey is possible the strongest large sample study of governments’ service 
production practices” (p. 334). Providing a half-page description of both asset specificity and 
ease of measurement, Brown and Potoski asked participants to rate each of the 64 services 
included in the ICMA survey on a scale from 1 to 5 for both transaction cost factors. “For the 
ease of measurement scale, the high end of the scale point was anchored by the word difficult 
(scored 5) and the low end of the scale was anchored by the word easy (scored 1)” (p. 334). 
Similarly, asset specificity was scaled as high (scored 5) and low (scored 1). Higher values on 
each scale indicated that the service was more asset specific or more difficult to measure.  
Results from Brown and Potoski’s (2005) research demonstrate that respondents ranked 
services such as prisons/jails to have high asset specificity (4.04) and are difficult to measure 
(3.21). However, services such as buildings and grounds maintenance that are easy to measure 
(2.00) also tend to lack assets that are highly specific (2.00).  
Case Study #1: Privatizing Sandy Springs, Georgia and Weston, Florida 
Both Sandy Springs, Georgia and Weston, Florida outsource most of their government 
services to private vendors. Studies have addressed why these towns chose to privatize and how 
they have been successful in doing so. Similar in size, Sandy Springs as a population of 65,000 
with an annual operating budget of 90 million; Weston has population of 94,000 with an annual 
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budget of 121 million. These affluent suburban communities have been criticized for isolating 
government resources from surrounding towns. Critics argue that wealthy communities who 
choose to incorporate cost the county more than they contribute. In Weston, a large majority of 
the local townspeople are in favor of privatization – so much so that they have written their 
preference for the private government model into their city charter. For a service to move back 
into the hands of the government, city council members must vote of 4/5 in favor of transitioning 
a service away from private vendors. Similarly, residents of Sandy Springs argue that a 94% 
majority voted in favor of outsourcing most of the local government. Small, local government in 
Weston operates with a total of 9 government employees while Sandy Springs operates with 7 
employees and 285 full-time private vendors (Holeywell, 2012; Segal, 2012).  
Brown and Potoski (2005) argue that services with high asset specificity that are difficult 
to measure should not be contracted out because these services have a high-risk contract failure. 
Their research suggests that services such as schools, health and human services, police, and fire 
services should be delivered by government, not private vendors. In both Weston, Florida and 
Sandy Springs, Georgia, tax-payers send half of their annual dollars to the counties they reside. 
The few services they keep in-house (schools, health and human services, police, and fire) are 
paid for by property tax dollars and are provided by county government (Holeywell, 2012; Segal, 
2012). 
Proponents of the enterprise model government in Weston argue that government is more 
efficient and does not have to worry about pensions, labor disputes, layoffs, or personnel issues. 
Mayor Eric Hersh believes that contract employees work harder because they don’t have the 
same job security as public service workers. According to Hersh, Weston doesn’t “…have to put 
up with a sub-par person just because (we) can’t get rid of them…From an efficiency standpoint, 
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that’s a huge benefit” (Holeywell, 2012, p. 7). Likewise, Sandy Springs officials support the 
private model because they too don’t have to worry about pensions, long-term debt, or personnel 
issues. Sandy Springs City Manager argues that “corporations hire superior workers and give 
them better training” (Segal, 2012, p. 2). Where it may take 15 public service workers to 
complete a job, private contractors can do the same work with only 12 employees. In Sandy 
Springs, contracts are written where non-performing employees can be terminated by the city 
government – it is then up to their private employer to determine how to handle the employee 
moving forward (Segal, 2012).  
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Table 1 
 
Contract Comparison between Weston, Florida and Sandy Springs, Georgia 
 
 
 
 
Weston, Florida Sandy Springs, Georgia 
Contract Provisions Consequences 
- Terminate vendors for non-
performance 
Specific, defined services 
Low asset specificity 
Easy to measure 
Vendor incentive = employment 
Consequences 
- Terminate contract and give to competitor 
to resume contract 
Specific, defined services  
Low asset specificity 
Easy to measure 
Vendor incentive = employment 
Contracted Services Maintenance 
Engineering 
Emergency Dispatch 
Code Enforcement 
Building Permits 
Public Works 
Custodial Services  
Maintenance  
Engineering 
Emergency Dispatch 
Licensing  
Permits 
City Court and Judge 
Waste Management 
Public Services 
 (High Transaction Costs) 
Schools  
Fire  
Police 
Health and Human Services 
Schools  
Fire  
Police 
Impact  
 
Costs county 
Pays county ½ of property taxes  
County provides public services 
$121,000,000 annual budget 
Socioeconomic divide 
Costs county 
Pays county half of property taxes 
County provides public services 
$90,000,000 annual budget 
Socioeconomic divide 
Personnel  9 government employees 
No pension 
No “personnel issues” 
No union 
No labor disputes 
No layoffs 
7 government employees 
No pension 
No “personnel issues” 
No long-term debt 
 
 
Demographics 65,000 population 
Wealthy 
Suburban 
Predominantly white 
94,000 population 
Wealthy 
Suburban 
Predominantly white 
Risks Impact on County 
Process centered 
Impact on County 
Process centered  
Behavior Privatization preference written in city 
Charter 
Requires 4/5 vote by City to make 
reverse private model  
Privatization preference  
94% city approval in favor of contracting 
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Both communities have clear contract provisions written in to their agreements with 
private vendors. In the event a vendor doesn’t perform, the city maintains the right to tell the 
private employer to terminate the employee from the position. In Sandy Springs, Georgia, if a 
private company doesn’t fulfill their contractual obligations, the lower bidding competitor, who 
originally lost, will be asked to step in and complete the contract. The incentive for the vendor in 
both systems is to perform to maintain their job. If they don’t perform, Weston and Sandy 
Springs draft their contracts to take the job away and give it to someone who can complete the 
contractual obligations (Holeywell, 2012; Segal, 2012).   
Additionally, both Weston and Sandy Springs contract their services out to multiple 
vendors and “slice the work into pieces” so it is easier to manage and oversee. Brown and 
Potoski (2005) suggest that dividing contracts out for specific services and to vendors who are 
experts in those services make contracts easier to measure and result in successful outcomes. 
Weston outsources public building maintenance, engineering, emergency dispatch, code 
enforcement, building permits, public works and custodial services. Sandy Springs contracts out 
maintenance, engineering, emergency dispatch, licensing, permits, the city court and judge, waste 
management, road services, and maintenance storage facilities (Holeywell, 2012; Segal, 2012). 
Supporters in Weston argue that prior to the enterprise model, they weren’t receiving the 
amount of services they were actually paying for with their tax-dollars. After privatizing most 
government services, locals found that the government became more efficient. Similarly, 
residents in Sandy Springs took a survey and results demonstrated that the private model 
improved quality of life and government services (Holeywell, 2012; Segal, 2012). 
While government leaders in both Weston, Florida and Sandy Springs, Georgia support 
outsourcing government services in the name of efficiency, it is important to identify potential 
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risks associated with the privatization of government. Successful in their endeavors, city officials 
claimed that privatization has created a more efficient government. Both Weston and Sandy 
Springs align with the theory of ‘when and what to contract out’ supported by Brown and Potoski 
(2005). They keep services (schools, health and human services, fire, and police) with high-asset 
specificity, that are difficult to measure in-house. They divide and outsource services with low-
asset specificity and are easy to measure to multiple vendors. Using the Transaction-Cost 
Framework promoted by Brown and Potoski, Weston and Sandy Springs have seemingly 
demonstrated how to successfully outsource public service delivery to private vendors 
(Holeywell, 2012; Segal, 2012). 
The ‘hollow-state’ refers to the capacity in which government loses control and oversight 
over production and service delivery (Milward & Provan, 2000). Weston and Sandy Springs 
succeeded in maintaining control and oversight of public service delivery by writing clear 
contract provisions and maintaining the ability to control the outputs of the contract. Government 
leaders chose to outsource services that had low transaction costs, wrote clear and measurable 
contracts, and issued consequences for non-performance. Referencing Milward and Provan, 
Weston and Sandy Springs did not become hollow-states. However, critics of the enterprise 
model argue that the loss of control and oversight, or becoming hollow, is not the only risk in 
outsourcing government.  Perhaps the more important feature of the privatization of these two 
communities, is a potential threat to democratic values and ethics.   
With limited literature on success stories about the privatization of local government, and 
fewer proponents than critics, perhaps the narrative written about Weston, Florida and Sandy 
Springs, Georgia largely focuses on the efficiency of the model while overlooking the risks. The 
transaction-cost framework assumes easily measurable services with low asset specificity have 
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few transaction costs and result in successful contract outcomes (Brown & Potoski, 2005). 
However, Brown and Potoski also suggest this framework does not address or consider the role 
and potential impact of democratic values in public service delivery.  
While successful, Weston, Florida and Sandy Springs, leaders who drafted and 
implemented vendor contracts focused on the efficiency of privatization. Oliver W. Porter, the 
founding father and ‘architect in chief’ of Sandy Springs, is a retired AT&T Engineer whose 
“philosophical inclinations were formed by a life spent in private enterprise” (Segal, 2012, p. 9) 
One could argue that Porter is highly trained in the art of drafting a contract. However, Georgia 
State Senator Vincent Ford believes that Sandy Springs is “… seeking to leave the rest of Fulton 
County behind and doing so with … arguments about corruption and inefficiency of local 
government” (Segal, 2012, p. 7). In response, Sandy Springs Mayor Eva Galambos claims that “a 
94% vote in favor of incorporation speaks to the broad community support” (Segal, 2012, p. 7). 
 While the community may be in favor of privatization, Frederickson and Dubnick (2009) 
warn public managers that ethics and democratic value system can be lost when a majority of 
government services are outsourced to private actors.   
While contracting can improve the functions of government, if not strategically executed, 
it can blur the role of government and the ways in which it serves the public (Agranoff, 2006; 
Koppell & Auer, 2012).  Considering the growing momentum towards contracting, Frederickson 
and Dubnick (2009) address factors that impact public administration today. The role of 
accountability is addressed in a framework which focuses on the inputs, processes, and outcomes 
of privatization as a measure for time, and the means (mechanisms) and ends (virtues) as a 
measure for value.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CASE STUDY #2 
Case Study #2: Performance at Pelican Bay State Prison  
In California, inmates, state officials, and human rights groups have accused private 
administrators at Pelican Bay State Prison of misusing state funds, breaking contract obligations, 
and violating state law for the cruel and unusual treatment of prisoners by prison officials.   
Pelican Bay State Prison (PBSP) is a supermax prison built in 1989 located rural Crescent 
City, California. The prison was commissioned by the California Department of Corrections 
(CDC) to house 1,059 prisoners in solitary confinement otherwise referred to Secure Housing 
Units (“the SHU”) (Reiter, 2011; Parenti, 1999). The prison was intended to hold “the worst of 
the worst” offenders with cells in the SHU designed to inflict extreme sensory deprivation 
(Reiter, 2011; Ruiz et al. v. Brown Jr. et al., 2012). Cells in the SHU are windowless 8 x 10 feet 
concrete rooms with no temperature control and florescent lights that remain on 24 hours a day. 
Prisoners are held in cells for no less than 22 hours a day—only permitted to exit to shower or 
exercise in slightly larger cells called ‘dog runs.’  
Contrary to policies and rules outlined by the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation (CDCR), most inmates are denied medical and mental health care, fresh and 
adequate amounts of food, showers, educational programs, human contact, or exposure to 
daylight. Thousands of inmates across the state of California organized three massive hunger 
strikes (in 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2013) to show solidarity against many call the harshest solitary 
confinement regulations in the country (Law, 2013, Morain, 2013). In July 2013, more than 
30,000 inmates across California organized the largest prison strike in U.S. history (Morain).  
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In 2012, inmates – legally representing all prisoners detained in the SHU – filed a class 
action lawsuit against California Governor Jerry Brown, Jr., Matthew Cate (Secretary of the 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation), Anthony Chaus, (Chief of the Office 
of Correctional Safety), and G.D. Lewis (Warden of Pelican Bay State Prison) (Ruiz et al. v. 
Brown Jr. et al., 2013). The plaintiffs claimed that they were detained in the SHU for excessively 
long periods of time without receiving meaningful reviews of their placement in solitary. Of the 
large plaintiff class, more 500 prisoners have been in the SHU for more than 10 years and 78 
have remained there for more than 20 years. Prisoners are placed in the SHU if they are suspected 
of being affiliated with a gang in any capacity. The only way to get out of the SHU is through a 
process called ‘debriefing’ in which prisoners must ‘snitch’ on other prisoners by telling 
correctional officers names of people associated with gangs.  
Organizations like PBSB might compel people workers to continue unethical behavior 
due to a history of correctional officer retaliation against those who broke the code of silence. 
The roles of various PBSP officials are perceived as not only a means to an end, but also as a 
mechanism for advancing a hierarchical and exclusive culture of survival rather than one based 
on ethics (Dubnick & Frederickson, 2009). Role definitions don’t account for the entirety of 
behaviors necessary to perform the job and workers will therefore exercise some degree of moral 
judgment to fulfill their role. 
Is it a Problem with the People or the Rule? 
Various statements from both sides of the case provide evidence to the argument that 
prison leaders have advanced an unethical culture among correctional officers and staff and 
PBSP. Ex-County Assessor Jerry Cochran described the massive economic benefit of the prison. 
Prior to the prison being built, Crescent City was one of the poorest rural communities in 
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California. In 1986, Del Norte County—where Crescent City resides—collected $76 million in 
sales tax. Just over ten years later in 1997, the county collected $142 million—nearly double the 
amount collected prior to the prison being built. Cochran stated that “without the prison, we 
wouldn’t exist” (Parenti, para. 5, 1999). PBSP official Tom Hopper stated that “the prison saved 
the community and people are grateful” (Parenti, 1997, para. 26). Parenti (1997) discusses that 
economic impact of the community and the impact it has had on the decisions and behaviors of 
prison officials. Most officials argue against claims from the prisoners noting that prisoners 
housed in the SHU want out because the unit prevents them from conducting necessary gang 
business. The official union for correctional officers at PBSP, the California Correctional Peace 
Officers Association, has stuck by their defense stating that prison officials have the right to 
place prisoners in the SHU and choose the duration of their punishment to limit gang violence 
(Carroll, 2013).  
Defense Attorney John Levy provides more insight into unethical behaviors of prison 
officials. He suggests that the prison brings so much economic relief to the area that officials and 
community members alike employ a code of silence—hiding the fact that any wrongdoing 
against prisoners is taking place. Levy argues that the CDCR has power extending far beyond the 
actual prison claiming that officials leverage economic benefits and violent intimidation to 
silence any form of dissent among criminal defense attorneys, former guards, or community 
members who challenge the system (Parenti, 1997). Nicole Hanrahan, California Prison Focus 
investigator believes that prison convictions are job security for the town. The more inmates 
placed in indefinite detention, the more certainty that there will be a cash flow (Parenti, 1997).  
Similarly, defense attorney Tom Easton believes that “the more prisoners they can pack 
in, the more money comes down the pipe” (Parenti, 1997, para. 16). Easton was the former head 
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of operations for the prison and was harassed after filing suit against the prison for making death 
threats to four ex-maintenance workers who testified against the prison in a corruption case. 
Easton notes that the prison has two undercover units—the Special Services Unit (SSU) and the 
Investigative Services Unit (ISU) operate with classified budgets. These units conduct 
surveillance on the community and keep dossiers on lawyers and activists who support the 
defense of prisoners (as confirmed by CDC officials) Officials in these units have been caught 
intimidating whistle blowers and in one case they chased down a guard as he attempted to deliver 
condemning evidence to the FBI (Parenti, 1997). 
In 1991, John Cox broke the officer’s code of silence by testifying against a fellow guard 
who allegedly framed a prisoner and then beat him in the head with the butt of a gun. Cox claims 
that PBSP officials called him a snitch and warned him to “watch his back” (Parenti, 1997).  
Cox also became a target because he required that his guards complete 100 extra hours of 
on-the-job training—well beyond the normal 40 hours of training. His training requirements were 
perceived by administrators and treason against the prison (Parenti, 1997).   
Cox points to cases in the past to illustrate the horrendous acts of PBSP staff. In one case, 
guards and medical experts boiled an inmate alive while reciting racial slurs (Parenti, 1997). 
Cox claims that guards are constantly framing prisoners so that their sentences grew 
decades beyond original prison-time (Parenti, 1997).  “Cox, playing by the rules, found it almost 
impossible to do his job” and decided to leave the prison after deciding he could no longer stand 
by and support his fellow employees and prison administrators (Parenti, 1997, para. 22). “They 
called … (my jurisdiction) of the SHU the ‘fluffy SHU’ because we didn’t hog-tie inmates to 
toilets or kick them in the face after cell extractions” (Parenti, 1997, para. 21).  
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Since leaving, Cox claims that he has been continuously harassed by local prison 
supporters. Cox has had found bullets shot through windows in his house, prank calls, sugar in 
his gas tank, slashed tires, and various death threats to him and his family.  Cox claims that the 
DA has refused to investigate his claims, recommending that he talk to the prison to resolve any 
issues he may have. 
Various human rights groups and PBSP prisoners have filed lawsuits against the prison 
for committing what many call ‘state-sanctioned torture.’ While some lawsuits remain open, 
others have resulted in court orders requiring the prison to eliminate unwritten policies that 
support violence against prisoners (Ruiz v. Brown, 2012). 
Dubnick and Frederickson (2009) argue that people working in complex public-sector 
organizations like PBSP are held accountable to public constituencies. Policies and behavioral 
conduct advanced by administrative officials at PBSP impact correctional officers perceptions of 
right and wrong. Furthermore, administrative officials exemplify unethical actions and therefore 
can substantiate unwritten policies and standards of operation that reach outside the scope of 
ethical practices or the law.  As such, administrative officials who have condoned unethical or 
illegal practices by way of allowing prisoner abuse set examples that have advanced a outputs 
that achieved contract provisions  
PBSP employed most of the rural town it was situated. It brought new economy and 
opportunity for what had been a struggling low-income area. Where private vendors are typically 
motivated by monetary incentives government agents are often motivated to outsource services 
for government efficiency. While California government officials outsourced PBSP to protect 
citizens, PBSPs motivation was to keep the prison full as it relies on prisoner retention to make a 
profit. PBSP arguably uses solitary confinement and, denying inmates rights to hearings for 
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release, as a means to achieve contract success.  They ways in which they achieve that outcome is 
promoting outputs that challenge democratic values. PBSP continues unjust treatment and 
unethical practices because it is not bound by a democratic value system and receives limited 
oversight while providing a service that highly difficult to measure.  
Policies and behavioral conduct advanced by administrative officials at PBSP impact 
correctional officers perceptions of right and wrong. Furthermore, administrative leaders promote 
unethical behavior further substantiating behavioral outputs that benefit the prison while 
challenging democratic values such as a fair judicial system, accountability, transparency, and 
responsiveness to the public.  
Brown and Potosky (2005) suggest outsourcing prisons has high transactions costs and 
often results in contract failure. Furthermore, public officials trained in law and justice may offer 
more specialized expertise than private vendors with no public training or experience.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Discussion 
These examples align with the Transaction Cost Framework. Sandy Springs, Georgia and 
Weston, Florida outsourced services that were east to measure and had low-asset specificity. 
Government officials in both communities drafted clear contract provisions, maintained control 
over outputs, provided contract oversight, and enforced consequences for non-performance. The 
first case study demonstrates that when government services are outsourced selectively and 
strategically, government contracts can be successful.  
While both towns achieved a largely successful outsourced government, scholars 
acknowledge that the predominantly white wealthy suburban communities isolated themselves 
and created economic hardship for surrounding low-income minority communities.  This 
example of success also indicates that contracting can have negative implications for promoting 
public service delivery with a democratic value system.  
Prison officials at PBSP are private vendors employed in part by funding from California 
to house inmates convicted by way of the U.S. legal system. It is true that rules for PSBP are 
clearly defined.by state laws and regulations operating in conjunction with of a democratic 
justice system. However, PBSP demonstrates that clearly written contracts don’t necessarily 
encourage or create a democratic ethos among private delivering public services. Public 
managers should carefully compare the transaction costs with as well as the unique contract 
provisions that must be considered when outsourcing prisons. Theoretical frameworks are often 
contextual tools that can assist public administrators seeking to analyze complex policy issues 
such as the one presented by Ruiz v. Brown (2012).  
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Dubnick and Frederickson (2009) suggest that input mechanisms promising control 
through hierarchy and standardized procedures, create accountability; whereas virtue is created 
through promises of integrity. This suggests individuals working in both sectors are more 
accountable when they feel they are part of an accountable culture. Processes promising ethical 
behavior suggest corruption and unethical behavior are preventable in the presence of 
mechanisms that hold people or groups accountable. Similarly, virtues are suggested to be upheld 
when the promise of democracy is modeled by horizontal and vertical procedures for 
accountability (p. 145).  
 Ultimately, private vendors work to achieve the outcome of the contract for the incentive 
of profit. In some cases, the drive to perform contractual duties outweighs democratic standards 
written in contracts as mechanisms for accountability.  
Recommendations 
NASPAA (National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration) 
recommends that accredited public administration programs ensure graduates are prepared for 
professional roles in public to private contracting (Cunningham, 2008; Snider & Rendon, 2010).  
As the accrediting body for professional degrees in public administration, NASPAA urges 
accredited programs to incorporate contract curriculum as a core focus for degree requirements. 
NASPAA provides clear standards on contract curriculum using the principles outlined by the 
Federal Acquisition Institute Contracting Competencies.   
Scholars have urged for contract curriculum with fiscal management and budgeting 
courses (Snider & Rendon, 2010; MacManus & Watson, 1990). Furthermore, Snider and Rendon 
argue that private-public contracting education is just as important as traditional coursework in 
public administration such as budgeting, strategic management, and human resource 
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management. Public managers who are trained before entering the field will have the capacity to 
know when to contract out for services, how to draft clear contract provisions, incentives, and 
consequences, and design mechanisms for overseeing and monitoring the lifecycle of the 
contract.  
The case studies of Sandy Springs, Georgia and Weston, Florida demonstrate what the 
townspeople argue as successful contracting. Alternatively, Pelican Bay State Prison illustrates 
the complexities of contract failure. Both Sandy Springs and Weston outsource services that 
according to Brown and Potoski (2005), can often result in contract success. On the other hand, 
PBSP outsourced services that are difficult to measure, hard to define, and have high asset 
specificity. According to the Transaction Cost Framework, outsourcing these services have a 
high risk for contract failure.  
While the Transaction Cost Framework can be used as tool for deciding when and when 
not to contract, it does address the role of democratic values and a potential ‘transaction cost.’ 
Traditional government models promoted core democratic values including accountability, 
transparency, responsiveness, and efficiency (Snider & Rendon, 2012). “New Public 
Management brings a business-like approach to governing with values such as cost effectiveness, 
responsiveness to the citizen as a customer, market preferences (e.g. competition among public 
entities), and performance measurement” (p. 333).  
Snider and Rendon (2012) define legal values in contracting to include constitutional 
integrity, individual rights, equal protection, due process, contract law, ethics, resolutions, and 
disputes adjudication. The case of PBSP not only demonstrates a contract with high transaction 
costs, it points to a problem of training and performance. The private and public prison system in 
the United States is a complex cross-sector relationship where government judicial systems are 
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intended and constitutionally bound to govern the imprisonment and release of prisoners, private 
vendors are contracted to provide prison services. In the case of PBSP, private contractors were 
not incentivized to act according to a democratic value set. Prison officials, guards, and 
community members valued the economic benefit the prison brought to the community. The 
motivation for the private vendor for monetary – the more prisoners, the more profit. Perhaps due 
process was denied to prisoners in solitary confinement because the goal of the vendor was to 
keep as many assets, or prisoners, as possible to remain profitable. Furthermore, prison services 
are not only hard to measure, they are hard to define. A potential solution could be to draft 
contracts incentivizing vendors to reduce the rate of recidivism by providing educational and re-
entry programs. However, the evidence supporting outsourcing prisons suggests that prison 
services are extremely challenging to measure. Because private vendors may view prisoners 
directly correlated with financial gain, public managers should consider the necessity for 
government oversight, clear contract provisions, and effective tools to measure success. 
Snider and Rendon (2012) researched the number of NASPAA accredited master’s 
degree programs in 2011. Of the 165 programs, 4 had contracting and procurement related 
concentrations, 1 program required 1 core contracting course, and 44 offered contracted related 
electives. Both Rendon and Cunningham (2008) suggest that educators include more contracted 
related core curricula to NASPAA accredited graduate programs. The researchers consider public 
service values and public procurement broken down by policies, processes, and practices.  
The emergence of private contracting has influenced public agencies to create and 
provide tools for public managers to use in the contracting process (Cooper, 1980; Snider & 
Rendon, 2010). Federal agencies like the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of 
Energy (DOE) provide free guidebooks, measurement instruments, and contract templates for 
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public managers. Agencies such as ICMA offers research and articles on best practices for public 
managers in contracting and examples of contract services.  
The value-sets of traditional government models and models under New Public 
Management remain consistent: efficiency, accountability, and responsiveness are vital for 
maintaining a democratic ethos in public-private service delivery.  
 
Table 2 
Contracting and Procurement Perspectives 
Public Service Values Policies Processes Practices 
Pursuing the public interest 
• Accountability 
• Transparency 
 
• Appointing 
contracting officers 
• Publicizing contract 
actions 
 
• Agency review of contract 
documents  
• Public disclosure of RFPs 
and contracts 
• Conducting industry 
conferences for contracting 
• Solicit industry feedback 
 
Serving Professionally  
• Competence  
• Efficiency 
• Objectivity 
 
• Education/training 
requirements for 
procurement 
workforce 
• Procurement reform 
legislation/initiatives 
 
• Procurement planning 
• Source selection 
• Contract administration 
 
• Conducting market 
research  
• Evaluating proposals 
• Best value contract awards 
 
Acting Ethically 
• Uphold the public trust 
• Standards of conduct 
• Conflict of interest 
• Revolving door 
policies 
 
• Source selection  
• Contract negotiations 
 
• Determining fair and 
reasonable prices 
• Monitoring contractor 
performance 
Demonstrating 
• Respect 
• Equity  
• Fairness 
• Preferred sources of 
supply 
• Socioeconomic 
programs 
• Promoting 
competition  
• Determining contractor 
responsibility  
• Planning procurement 
strategy 
• Service contractor 
surveillance  
• Negotiating contract 
modifications 
• Processing contractor 
payments 
Snider, K.F. & Rendon, R.G. (2012). Public procurement: Public administration and public service perspectives. 
Journal of Public Affairs Education, 18(2), 327-348.   
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